1 The IoT security requirements can be divided into two major categories: secure communication and data security.
AbstrAct
In various scenarios, achieving security between IoT devices is challenging since the devices may have different dedicated communication standards and resource constraints as well as various applications. In this article, we first provide requirements and existing solutions for IoT security. We then introduce a new reconfigurable security framework based on edge computing, which utilizes a near-user edge device, that is, a security agent, to support security functions as IoT resources for the security requirements of all protocol layers including multiple applications on an IoT device. This framework is designed to overcome the challenges including high computation costs, low flexibility in key management, and low compatibility in deploying new security algorithms in IoT, especially when adopting advanced cryptographic primitives. We also provide the design principles of the reconfigurable security framework, the exemplary security protocols for anonymous authentication and secure data access control, and the performance analysis in terms of feasibility and usability. The reconfigurable security framework paves a new way to strengthen IoT security by edge computing.
IntroductIon
Due to the diverse types of consumer electronics, people's lives have been changed dramatically. Devices are interconnected by diverse types of communication technologies to the Internet, known as the Internet of Things (IoT), to exchange information. Nowadays, IoT devices are widely deployed based on the existing standards for various applications such as smart home, smart city, body networks, smart grid, vehicular ad hoc networks, and autonomous control systems. Many IoT alliances and consortia (Alljoyn, IEEE P2413, IPSO, OCF, OMA, etc.) have proposed their own standard frameworks for IoT among the developed standards. They attempt to manage things, devices, the provided information, and their computing ability as resources that can be interconnected and utilized. In this context, security is of the first priority to guarantee the availability and functionality of IoT applications. Only basic security protections (i.e., authenticated key exchange and access control) for the communications has been addressed in IoT related standard frameworks.
The security mechanism for IoT should support heterogeneous types of devices and communica-tion standards for applications, which leads to the requirement for comprehensive security protection [1] , such as anonymous protection and finegrained secure access control. Therefore, a new security framework is required, which can simplify deployment of security solutions and minimize the change of existing systems.
securIty Issues In Iot relAted ApplIcAtIons
The applications of IoT can be categorized into the following domains: the Internet of Transportation, Internet of Sensors/Controllers, Internet of Energy, and device-to-device/machine-to-machine communications. Exemplary applications of these domains include vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs), smart home, and smart grid. The security requirements of each application can be various according to application scenarios. For instance, VANETs need to keep the identity of each vehicle anonymous against location/session traceability, the smart home needs to protect the identity of each controller to conceal sensitive behaviors of each individual, and the smart grid will need to conceal electricity consumption against analysis in appliance usage. Besides the specific security requirements of each IoT application, there are generically challenging issues in guaranteeing security in IoT as follows: • Cross-application key management is complicated as each application may manage its security keys for specific security purposes [2] . A user device engaged in multiple applications needs to manage multiple security keys or passwords. This increases the risk of key disclosure and endangers the security of services. • Advanced cryptographic algorithms, for example, group signatures (GS) [3] for anonymous communications and attribute-based encryption (ABE) for access control on data, need to be performed on resource-constrained IoT devices. This will cause real-time IoT application to fail as the computation of the advanced algorithms cannot be completed in a pre-defined period. • Flexibility to support various security protections for diverse IoT applications with minimum changes in fundamentals (i.e., standard protocol, software, and hardware) is a significant factor to developers for usability. Due to the above issues, the challenges in satisfying IoT security requirements 1 include: • The complexity of key management for diverse application and data models For the security issues in IoT, the following existing solutions can be considered. AAA Framework and Extensible Authentication Protocol: The authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA) framework supports security services for applications such as mobile IP, network access service (NAS), and Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), in both local and roaming scenarios. 2 The EAP [4] is a standard authentication framework to support the flexibility of various security protocols based on the AAA framework, widely used in wireless networks. AAA and EAP offer certain flexibility in key management and various security protections [5] . However, the issue of computation costs in applying advanced algorithms still remains.
Access Control Techniques: Role-based access control (RBAC) has been widely used in software systems and applications for operating and managing resources. RBAC originated using the concept of user/group to grant permissions to access files in a UNIX system [6] . Attribute-based access control (ABAC) [7] , different from RBAC, provides finegrained access control by controlling each access with the given policies and the attributes of users. Those access control techniques may offer the flexibility in adopting various security measures by regarding each security service as an object.
Single Sign On Mechanism: Single sign on (SSO) is an access control technique that makes a user log into multiple software systems using one account. Many related standards have been proposed, such as the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) [8] , Kerberos network authentication service [9] , smart-card-based authentication, and Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML). In SSO, user account information is stored in databases on authentication servers. For every user accessing a software system, the SSO-based authentication involves the user, the authentication server, and the target system. SSO is akin to an access control system and also facilitates the flexibility of providing security services.
The above solutions allow certain flexibility to adopt comprehensive security measures and to control the access to security services. However, key management remains an issue since each device needs to maintain multiple security keys or certificates for diverse applications/services. Moreover, how to make the computation of advanced cryptographic algorithms feasible on resource-constrained devices is still an issue. Hence, a framework for the requirements of IoT security is essential, and is introduced for the above two issues in this article.
reconfIgurAble securIty wIth edge computIng
The edge computing is a new computing model [10] , where a near-user device with stronger computing power provides required resources for the applications of other resource-limited IoT devices. Based on edge computing, the challenges of high computation costs, low flexibility, and incompatibility in supporting security with advanced cryptography can be relieved by the new framework below.
We introduce a new reconfigurable security framework for IoT (ReSIoT) to overcome security challenges without changing the architectures or redesigning the standard protocol flows of IoT applications. The framework utilizes a new component, a security agent (SA), which is a near-user edge device such as a wireless router, base station, or service router. The computation capability of an SA is generally more powerful than that of most resource-limited IoT devices, and it can be used to offload the overhead of cryptographic computations at the resource-limited devices and centralized computing infrastructure.
Through the reconfigurable security, each device involving a security function (authentication, access control, etc.) only needs to guarantee secure communication with the SA by maintaining keys with the SA. The SA generates and distributes required security information with its security key, registered to a global key management system (GKMS), to complete corresponding security procedures between IoT devices. The benefits of the introduced reconfigurable security for IoT can be summarized as follows:
• The key management can be simplified from the application level to the user level in terms of IoT devices. • Due to the stronger computation capability of the SA, low-end devices will be able to be protected by advanced security algorithms requiring high computation costs. • Different from the previous concept of reconfigurable security in third/fourth generation (3G/4G) networks [1, 11] , 3 the introduced reconfigurable security for IoT does not require the system architectures of the original protocols and standards to be changed, and also considers all possible security requirements that can be fulfilled by cryptographic countermeasures. Different IoT applications on a device allow accessing the security functions, managed as IoT resources, on SAs via the IoT connectivity abstraction layer. 4 • Compared to cloud-based solutions, exploiting near-user edge devices for IoT security provides better scalability and usability. • Even though cloud-based computing may also help to offload computation overhead of security protection, users may need to give their security keys to cloud servers, while the reconfigurable security remains in security keys concealed by users. This article sheds light on the potential of reconfigurable security as an essential security framework for IoT, and is organized as outlined below. In the following section, security require-2 Remote Authentication Dial-in User Service (RADI-US) and Diameter are two standard protocols adopting AAA frameworks, where the latter is the newer standard but not fully backward compatible with RADIUS. 3 The concept of reconfigurable security has also been proposed for 3G/4G networks [11, 1] to resolve the security of 3G/4G interworking and roaming mobile devices. However, these frameworks only address requirements of secure communications; adopting the frameworks also requires changing the original system architectures. 4 The IoT connectivity abstraction layer is in charge of IoT messaging and is introduced in the next section.
The computation capability of SA is generally more powerful than that of most resource-limited IoT devices, and it can be used to offload the overhead of cryptographic computations at the resource-limited devices and centralized computing infrastructure.
ments of IoT are presented, and the potential security solutions and their limitations are then discussed. Following that, the system design and construction of reconfigurable security functions are provided, and their performances are evaluated in the final section.
securIty requIrements of resIot
Besides the common security requirements of confidentiality, integrity, availability, and non-repudiation, the ReSIoT gives rise to additional security issues regarding the computation of security functions (SFs) on SAs for IoT devices. The security requirements specifically aim at two kinds of adversaries: malicious IoT devices and honest but curious SAs, as shown in Fig. 1 . A malicious IoT device may misbehave during interactions with other IoT devices. An honest but curious SA may intercept the exchanged messages and trace the communication footprints among IoT devices. Hence, a reconfigurable security function (RSF) constructed by a specific SF should fulfill the additional security requirements as follows.
Confidentiality against Honest but Curious SAs: The confidentiality of message exchanges between IoT devices should be guaranteed, and the SA helps in computing SFs involving in the exchanged messages. The SA should not learn any information from the communications between IoT devices and the procedures of performing RSFs.
Authenticity against Malicious IoT Devices: The identity of each IoT device should be verifi-able by the SA to which it belongs. Before computing the specified SF for the requesting IoT devices, SAs should authenticate the devices first. This guarantees that unauthorized IoT devices do not abuse the capability of computing SFs by SAs.
Untraceability to IoT Devices against Honest but Curious SAs: Every SA should not be able to trace the identity of each IoT device in a communication session launched by IoT devices even if the SA helps to compute the SF of the session. This guarantees that footprints of all communications are kept secret to SAs involved in the computation.
Apart from the above security requirements, to achieve end-to-end security between IoT devices while performing RSFs with SAs, RSFs should also ensure the following two basic security requirements: only authorized SAs can provide SFs for IoT devices in proximity, and the authenticity and confidentiality are guaranteed for the messages exchanged between IoT devices and SAs in every execution of RSFs. We introduce how to achieve them by adopting a global AAA system later.
system ArchItecture of resIot
In this section, we first introduce the system architecture, including the proposed SA, and the system interactions of ReSIoT. The system architecture of the ReSIoT, which consists of IoT application servers, IoT security domains, GKMS, and an AAA system, is shown in Fig. 1 . An IoT security domain is formed by the devices belonging to the same application. Each device is equipped with a 
Communications between device and service router
Communications between different network domains unique identity associated with the corresponding secret key for the AAA system. IoT application servers support the required capabilities of computing and storage resources, logic operations, and application data and membership management. Each security domain has one or more dedicated service routers, which are interconnected with IoT devices and can access global communication networks, such as mobile networks and the Internet. The service routers are near-user edge IoT devices and considered as SAs that have sufficient resources to support advanced security algorithms. 5 For instance, a mobile device (e.g., smartphone) equipped with high computation capability and variant communication interfaces (e.g., UMTS or WLAN) can work as an SA to serve the security of other resource-limited IoT devices in proximity. Either a user or the manager of an application may deploy the selected SA in advance, and each SA will inherit the security protection mechanism of the underlying communication interface. By exploiting the computing resources of an SA, the computational costs of resource-limited IoT devices can be greatly offloaded. The deployment of an SA brings the following advantages: • Reduced complexity of key management for IoT devices • No requirement to upgrade hardware capabilities of IoT devices to fulfill advanced security mechanisms • High flexibility in adopting new security mechanisms protocol stAck And system InterActIons Figure 2 shows the protocol stack of ReSIoT, which supports the provision of reconfigurable security for various IoT security requirements. There are three main layers: the connectivity abstraction layer, security and resource layer, and application layer. The connectivity abstraction layer consists of network protocols,such as UDP/ID, Zigbee/ Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), and WLAN; session protection protocols, such as diagram transport layer security (DTLS) and TLS; and message-oriented Internet application protocols, such as Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), data distribution service (DDS), Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP), and message queue telemetry transport (MQTT). The security and resource layer includes a resource manager, security functions, and security agent. The resource manager maintains the capabilities of computing, communication, and data of IoT devices as resources. The security functions are supported by ReSIoT and also considered as security resources. The security agent is responsible for the functional support of ReSIoT. The application layer is composed of the applications as resources for servers, clients, and service routers of IoT frameworks.
The RSF is a protocol that can be realized as a cross-layered middleware, can be installed on SAs and IoT devices, and runs on operating system or hardware according to the type of devices. The implementation of the RSF depends on the required operations performed by IoT devices and an SA in a complete execution procedure of RSF. Using the RSF, the SA can perform SFs compatibly with IoT devices with all kinds of hardware, applications, and communication standards. By the application programming interfaces (APIs) of RSFs, each device is able to support the required security protection for various IoT application requirements.
As an access request of an RSF, sent by a specific application, is received by the connectivity abstraction layer, the resource manager will handle this request with the corresponding SF and perform the RSF with the cooperation of IoT devices and SAs. This enhances the flexibility of supporting various RSFs for not only IoT applications but also communication standards, where communication capabilities are also regarded as resources in IoT frameworks.
securIty protectIon by resIot
This section explores how the ReSIoT exploits the advantage of using near-user devices (i.e., SAs) to perform the RSF with IoT devices. First, we discuss how to simplify the key management across multiple IoT applications by ReSIoT. We then introduce the instantiations of two advanced security protection mechanisms, that is, anonymous authentication and ABAC for data protection, by the construction of ReSIoT.
key mAnAgement And constructIon of rsf
As depicted in Fig. 1 , each IoT domain deploys its own security keys for the subscriber IoT devices. As shown in Fig. 3 , in conventional IoT security, a device D i needs to maintain a set of security keys key Di = {KSS j1 ↔ Di , …, K SSjm i ↔Di } issued by the security servers of different IoT applications. To reduce the complexity of key management, Request security resource Perform RSF 5 The SA in the proposed framework is the kernel and different from the SAs in IPSEC and other related security protocols, which are located at the server side.
the IoT reconfigurable security adopts hierarchy-based key management. Specifically, the SA of each security domain maintains a credential for performing each RSF with the corresponding public/private key pair issued by GKMS. Note that a GKMS is considered as the global key management system by trust authorities. The credentials issued by GKMS for certain RSFs (e.g., GS and ABE) should support traceability and revocability [12, 13] . This offers additional security protections in case of dispute or corruption of SAs. The outputs of RSFs (e.g., signatures and ciphertexts) can be traced to the originator SA. The capability of performing RSFs can be suspended in case of the corruption of SAs.
Each IoT device or thing needs to maintain a secret shared, that is, Key Di AAA , with a global AAA system (e.g., home subscriber server/authentication center [HSS/AuC] in mobile networks) provided by network providers. With this secret, the authenticated secure communication among IoT devices and SAs relies on a certain AAA-based authentication and key exchange (AKE) protocol, such as EAP AKE protocol [5] . Each SA is assumed to maintain a secure channel to the AAA system.
constructIon of rsf
The construction of the RSF consists of two parts: IoT device attachment and conversion of SF into RSF. The attachment procedure, which involves an attached IoT device, an SA, and an AAA system, is to establish mutual authentication and secure communication between the IoT device and the SA. One can realize this procedure by a certain AAA-based authentication protocol, EAP authentication protocol [5] , with the shared secret key among IoT devices and an AAA system.
The conversion of SF into RSF involves IoT devices and SAs only, where the SAs help to perform SF for the IoT devices. Besides the security requirements fulfilled by the specific SF, the design of the RSF needs to additionally consider the security requirements, that is, confidentiality against SA, authenticity against malicious IoT device, and untraceability to IoT devices against SA, as introduced earlier.
rsf of group sIgnAtures for Anonymous AuthentIcAtIon
By anonymous authentication, one can authenticate an entity without knowing the exact identity, and for this, the identity of every authentication session should be randomized. Group signatures can be utilized to practice anonymous authentication by signing a given message as a signature of the specific group using merely a group-based public key credential. Figure 4a shows how to convert an SF of group signatures into its RSF for anonymous authentication between two IoT devices D i and D j . The SF consists of two functions (F, F -1 ) = (GSig, GVer), where GSig and GVer are the group signing and verifying functions in group signatures, respectively. GSig takes a group private key, sk i , assigned for each SA i and the signing message as inputs, and outputs a group signature, s i , which can be verified by GVer with the group public key, pk, which outputs true or false as the result of verifying s i .
Suppose that two devices are attached to individual SAs, SA i and SA j , by an EAP-based authentication with the global AAA system for the attachment. After the attachment, the instantiation of RSF by group signature SF consists of the following procedure: 1. D i sends auth_req = DH_X,Nonce i to authenticate D j , where DH_X = g x is one of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange tuple and Nonce i is a random number. 2. D j generates a shared key K = g xy by its
Diffie-Hellman tuple DH_Y = g y and the received DH_X, encrypts Nonce i as E j = E K (Nonce i ) with a symmetric encryption, and sends rand to SA j . 3. SA j generates a group signature s j on E j with sk j and sends E j to D j . 4. D j encrypts s j with the shared key K as E' j = E K (s j ), and sends (DH_Y, E' j ) to D i . 5. D i decrypts E' j to obtain s j with K computed by the received DH Y and sends s j to SA i for the verification of s j . 6. SA j verifies s j by performing F -1 (pk, s j ) and
returns true or false as the result if the group signature from D j is correct or not. If so, the anonymous authentication is done among D i and D j by the RSF of group signatures.
rsf of AttrIbute-bAsed encryptIon for AttrIbute-bAsed Access control
The ABAC allows a device to access protected things (e.g., multimedia content) or devices (e.g., sensors) with the verification of the attributes assigned to IoT devices and the policy set for the protected target. The ABE provides secure ABAC by encrypting messages with the public key of ABE and a specified policy (i.e., a predicate of attributes). Only the devices with legitimate secret keys associated with the attributes that satisfy the policy can decrypt the encryption. This implies that the verification of attributes and policies is achieved via the attribute-based encryption and decryption of ABE. Here, we want to build an RSF of ABE by the SF of ABE to practice fine-grained access control in IoT. The SF consists of two functions, (G, G -1 ) = (ABEnc, ABDec), where ABEnc and ABDec are the encryption and decryption functions of ABE. Figure 4b depicts how to convert an ABE SF to its RSF for secure ABAC among two IoT devices with SAs.
The construction follows the procedures below: 1. In the beginning, both D i and D j perform the attachment procedures, which are the same as that in the RSF of group signatures, and exchange a shared key K by Diffie-Hellman key exchange. 2. D i encrypts its data and Acknowledgment ack with K as E i =E K (data||ack), and sends E i and the ABAC policy to SA i . 3. SA i encrypts E i by G with the public key pk and policy as E' i and sends it back to D i . 4. D i encrypts E' i with K as E'' i = E K (E' i ) and sends E' i to D j . 5. D j decrypts E'' i to obtain E' i and forwards it to SA j . 6. SA j decrypts E' i by G -1 with its private key sk j to obtain E' i and sends it back to D j . 7. D j decrypts E' i to obtain data and ack, and sends ack to confirm the correctness of the decryption. If the attributes of sk j satisfy policy, D j will obtain the exact same data and ack shared with D i .
securIty AnAlysIs
We discuss how the two proposed RSFs can fulfill the three additional security requirements presented earlier as follows. First, since a session key is shared by Diffie-Hellman key agreement in every RSF session, the SA can only compute encrypted messages and learn no messages exchanged between two IoT devices from computing specified SF for IoT devices. This guarantees the confidentiality against honest but curious SAs. Second, IoT devices fulfill the authenticity of every IoT device attaching to the SA in its proximity. Finally, the communication sessions launched by the same IoT device will not be traceable when anonymous authentication is adopted in the IoT device attachment procedure. Hence, the computing of SFs on SAs will not break the security of communications among IoT devices.
performAnce of resIot
This section evaluates the communication and computation costs of two RSFs, described in Fig.  4 . Advanced cryptographic algorithms are used such as Boneh-Boyen-Shacham group signatures (BBS GS) [14] and Goyal-Sahai-Pandey-Waters attribute-based encryption (GSPW ABE) [7] for anonymous authentication and ABAC. The SA is commonly considered as a relatively powerful device among IoT devices. Hence, we take a desktop computer (Apple Macbook Air 2012 model equipped with Intel Core i5 (dual-core) 1.8 GHz CPU and 4 GB RAM) as an SA and a smartphone (ASUS Zenfone 2 ZE551ML equipped with Quad-core 1.8 GHz CPU and 2 GB RAM model) as IoT devices to observe the performance enhancement with the ReSIoT in the experiments. 6 compArIson of computAtIonAl cost for cryptogrAphIc AlgorIthms
Before comparing the performance of reconfigurable security with legacy security solutions, we first analyze the computational costs of two cryptographic algorithms, BBS GS and GSPW ABE, on the testbed platforms. The algorithms employ the bilinear pairing operation [15] , which is an elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) arithmetic operation and comes at considerable computational cost to execute the algorithms. In Table 1 , we present the computational time of the bilinear pairing related operations, including multiplication (Mul), exponentiation (Power), and pairing in the same bilinear pairing groups on both platforms by the Java Pairing-Based Cryptography (JPBC) library. Using those computational times, we can obtain the computational times of two SFs on the SA and IoT device, respectively.
processIng tIme
We compare the performance of RSFs with the legacy solutions for two security requirements: anonymous authentication and ABAC. Here, legacy solutions are those that simply perform SFs (i.e., BBS GS and GSPW ABE) on IoT devices for the aforementioned security requirements. First, the processing time for completing RSF with IoT devices and SA can be denoted as
attach is the attachment time of IoT devices to SAs, t D RSF is the computation time of IoT devices for RSF, t S A RSF is the computation time of RSF on SAs (which is basically equal to the computation time of SF on SAs), t S A RSF , t D COM is the communication time between IoT devices, and t D-SA COM is the communication time between IoT devices and 
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, policy 6 These devices have been adopted with the expectation of the computing capability evolution that will occur even in small IoT devices in the future.
SAs. Since each device only needs to attach the SA in its communication coverage at the beginning, we therefore eliminate the time of attachment to SA in evaluating T RSF . We denote the processing time of completing SF with merely IoT devices as T SF = t D SF + t D COM , where t D SF is the computation time of SF on an IoT device. We estimate t D COM by observing the communication of WiFi Direct, which is one of the wireless communication standards for device-to-device communications, and t D-SA COM by observing the communication between a smartphone and a PC server via wireless AP. In the experiment, t D COM is 56 ms and t D-SA COM is 243 ms on average by transmitting 1024bit string for 1000 times.
The computation and communication time of the signing and verification of BBS GS and the encryption and decryption of GSPW ABE are summarized in Table 1 . From Table 1 , we can see that the processing time has been reduced by from 83.42 percent to 71.46 percent by the RSF. This result shows that even though the RSFs require additional communications among IoT devices and SAs, the processing times of RSFs still outperform those of the conventional SFs thanks to the significant amount of high-complexity computations being offloaded to SAs.
We then can estimate the rate of completing functions required by a security request within the request expiration time, which we call the success rate of security requests. Here, we consider the load at the SA as well. An SA may serve multiple devices at once, and the SA will reserve its resource (e.g., CPU and required memory for processing) for each incoming security request issued by devices or things to serve in a first-come first-serve (FCFS) manner. The incoming request needs to wait in a queue to be processed when the SA is busy with other requests. The security request will fail whenever the device or thing issuing a request loses its connection to the SA or the session time of the request expires before completing the process for the security request.
Hence, the expected processing time of each security service can be determined by averaging out the processing time t S A RSF when t S A RSF ≤ t exp , where t exp is the expiration time of a request, t S A RSF = t Q SA + t S A SF , and t Q SA is the waiting time in queue for a request. Figure 5 shows the total processing time and the success rate of security requirements according to the arrival rate of security requests for different values of expiration time of security request t exp . In this figure, c k (= l k t S A SF ) is the scaled arrival rate of security requests (i.e., the arrival rate in t S A SF ), and c 2 (= t S A RSF /t S A SF ) is the scaled total processing time of RSF. Here, we use a fixed value, 208.5 ms, for t S A SF (the computational time of a signing operation of BBS group signature) and increase l k up to l k = 1/t S A SF (i.e., c k = 1) to keep a steady state of queue in the simulation. From Fig. 5 , we can first see that even for c k = 1, the success rate is greater than 80 percent. For the arrival rate less than 0.7t S A SF (i.e., c k < 0.7), the success rate is higher than 90 percent for all cases of request expiration time.
summAry
In this article, after overviewing issues and existing solutions of IoT security, we introduce a reconfigurable security framework based on edge computing, which utilizes a near-user edge device (i.e., an SA) with stronger computation capability for IoT security. Based on the framework, one can design a reconfigurable security function protocol, interacting with an SA, to resolve any specific security requirements. We also provide two exemplary reconfigurable security function protocols for anonymous authentication and secure attribute-based access control. Through the performance analysis, it is shown that reconfigurable security function protocols outperform legacy solutions even though additional communications are required to interact with the SA. The reconfigurable security can provide security protection for IoT devices with better flexibility and scalability Pairing,
Power, in hardware (e.g., computational capability and memory) and software (e.g., various standards and the complexity of key management due to comprehensive application scenarios). 
